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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to pressing environmental concerns, there is a global
consensus to commit to a sustainable energy future. Germany
has embraced Energiewende – a bold sustainable energy
policy of no operational nuclear plants by 2022. California
has set an ambitious goal that mandates 50% renewable
penetration by 2025, 60% by 2030, and 100% by 2045 [1].
The vast integration of renewable energy into the power
grid imposes daunting challenges to the conventional supply-
side control paradigm. First of all, renewable energy is
intermittent and uncertain. Integrating renewable energy will
reduce the system inertia, inject undesirable variability, and
substantially increase the need for system reserves. These
reserves are typically provided by conventional generators.
However, conventional generators have limited capacity and
ramping rate, and they produce carbon emissions that defeat
the carbon benefit of renewable integration. On the other
hand, the increasing penetration of renewable energy also
squeezes the response time needed to balance the power
grid. That is, the time to make critical operating decisions
is decreasing from minutes to seconds and in some cases
even sub-seconds due to the increasing variability of supply
and demand. The shorter response time for decision-making
places significant challenges on the conventional power grid
that requires human interaction.
A promising pathway for large-scale renewable integration
is through distributed energy resources (DERs). DERs are
those small-scale assets connected to the distribution power
network [2], including distributed generators, electricity stor-
age, smart loads, among others. They are typically close
to the load and can be used individually or in aggregation
to reduce the power from the transmission, enhance grid
security, decrease carbon emissions, and allow the deferral
of new transmission lines and large power plants [3]. Various
types of control strategies have been proposed to engage
both customer-owned and third-party DERs into the power
system operation. The first one is direct control, where utility
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companies remotely control the end-use loads based on prior
mutual agreements. The second one is the price control,
where pricing signals are sent to end-use loads to affect local
demand. Common examples of price control include Time
of Use (TOU) pricing, Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), and Real
Time Pricing (RTP). Recently, transactive control is a new
type of control strategy that automates and engages DERs
through the market interaction. This is an emerging control
paradigm originated from the Pacific Northwestern National
Laboratory. Built upon the idea of price control, transactive
control derives the pricing signal by coordinating individual
DERs at the system level through the market. In this way,
DERs are engaged in price discovery.
The GridWise Architecture Council (GWAC) first coined
the term “transactive energy” for this new concept. It is
defined as “a set of economic and control mechanism that
allows the dynamic balance of supply and demand across
the entire electrical infrastructure using value as a key
operational parameter”. Before 2015, several field demon-
stration projects were implemented in the U.S. and Europe
to showcase applications of transactive control in power
systems and testify its technology feasibility in real sys-
tem deployment. These demonstration projects include the
Olympic Peninsula Demonstration (2006–2007) [4], [5], the
AEP Ohio gridSMART R© Demonstration (2010–2014) [6],
[7], the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration (2010–
2015) [8], [9], and PowerMatching City (2009–2015) [10].
Since then, transactive control has received substantial atten-
tions in the research community and many research results
have been published [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18]. Transactive energy systems are deeply intertwined
with many topics in microeconomics and control, including
competitive equilibrium [19], [20], contract theory [21], [22],
mechanisms design [23], [24], Stackelberg games[25], to
name a few. It also involves numerous applications such
as thermostatically controlled loads [26], [27], [15], electric
vehicles [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], distributed generators
[33], [34], among others.
One challenge in understanding the literature is the lack of
a unifying framework to systematically analyze and compare
the existing results. In the literature, many works are closely
related but intricately different. If there is a slight change in
one problem with respect to the information structure, the
decision-making order or the rationality assumption, it could
lead to another problem that is completely different in nature.
Unfortunately, these intricacies are often neglected in the
literature, which causes significant efforts in understanding
the existing results and developing the new results. This gives
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rise to the following questions: how to formally compare
different transactive energy systems? How to formulate a
proper transactive energy system to solve a given problem?
What tools are available in the literature for each class of
transactive energy systems?
This paper answers these questions by synthesizing a
unifying framework that standardizes the formulation of
transactive energy systems to facilitate the analysis of most
transactive energy systems studied in the literature. This
framework consists of four key elements: agent preference,
control decision, information structure, and solution con-
cept. Agent preference specifies the preferred outcome by
each agent and models the conflict of interest in decision
making. Control decision specifies the set of decisions for
each agent to maximize its payoff. Information structure
describes the information available to each agent before it
makes a decision. Solution concept encodes the rationality
assumptions of each agent in the system. These elements
are important in identifying and distinguishing different
transactive energy systems. In this paper, we summarize a
number of important classes of transactive energy systems
including the competitive market, Stackelberg game, reverse
Stackelberg game, and mechanism design. Each class of
transactive energy systems has a specific formulation under
the proposed unifying framework. The connections and dif-
ferences between different classes are discussed. Available
tools and results for each class are also surveyed.
II. UNIFYING FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSACTIVE ENERGY
SYSTEMS
To substantiate the necessary development of a unifying
mathematical framework for transactive energy systems,
consider the following power system problem as a sim-
ple motivating example that well illustrates the underlying
subtleness and complexity associated with the design of
transactive energy systems. Suppose that one geographic area
receives the electricity from the main power grid through
a radial transmission line that is capacity constrained. Due
to the significant growth of the population in this area, the
capacity of the connection to the main grid is expected
to become inadequate to supply all the cooling demand
during hot summer conditions. In this case, transmission line
congestion may occur when all the residents in the area turn
on their air conditioners for cooling, which increases the
risk of transformer failure due to significant overloading. To
address this problem, transmission upgrade is a straightfor-
ward but expensive solution. If a large amount of residential
air conditioners were equipped with smart thermostat that
permits advanced control, the deployment of transactive
energy system can be considered as a non-wires alternative
to infrastructure upgrading for congestion management. The
basic idea is to treat the constrained transmission capacity as
a scarce resource, and create a market among all customers
within the area to realize resource allocation. The demand
from individual customers will be coordinated by appropriate
market signals so that the total demand from the area can
be maintained below the capacity limit. The context of this
problem is very straightforward. However, when it comes
to the actual design of transactive energy system, many
practical questions arise:
• What is the objective of the system coordinator?
• What are the objectives of individual household owners
who has controllable air conditioners?
• Would market participants consider their market power
on prices?
• Would market participants share their private informa-
tion with the coordinator?
• What form of signals shall be communicated between
system operator and market participants?
The answers to these questions greatly vary according to
the underlying assumptions over the system. As long as
the answer to any one of these questions is different, the
resulting mathematical formulations could be different as
well. Therefore, this necessitates a unifying framework that
systematically pinpoints the conceptual difference between
different formulations.
In this section, we propose such a unifying framework
for market-based coordination of DERs. It consists of four
elements that are essential to specify a transactive energy
system. These elements include agent preference and con-
straint, control decision, information structure, and solution
concept, which are elaborated in more details in the follow-
ing subsections.
A. Agent Preference
Consider a group of N DERs connected to the distribution
power networks. A coordinator employs economic principles
and tools to coordinate these DERs, forming a transactive
energy system. We refer to this system as a multi-agent
system consisting of N + 1 agents that are indexed by
i, where i = 0 denotes the coordinator agent, and i ∈
{1, . . . , N} the resource agents. In this system, individual
DERs have their preferences over the energy generation or
consumption, which is referred to as energy allocation in the
following. The coordinator have its own preference over the
energy allocations for individual DERs as well. We encode
these distinct, and possibly private, preferences into payoff
functions. These payoff functions describe the mapping
from the energy allocations and energy prices for individual
DERs to real numbers that quantify the preferences of the
coordinator agent and resource agents, respectively.
Let ai ∈ Ai be the energy allocation for resource agent
i, where Ai is the set of local constraints on the energy
allocation ai. Denote a = (a1, . . . , aN ) and A = A1×· · ·×
AN . Let λi ∈ R be the energy price for resource agent
i, where Λi is the set of admissible prices for λi. Denote
λ = (λ1, . . . , λN ) and Λ = RN . Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that the payoff functions of individual DERs
could depend on the energy allocations and energy prices of
other DERs. Then, the payoff function of resource agent i,
∀i = 1, . . . , N , can be mathematically represented as
Ui(a, λ; θi) : A× Λ→ R, (1)
where θi ∈ Θi denotes the private information of resource
agent i. We refer to θi as type. The type of resource agent i
may be unknown to other agents. Let A0 be the set of global
constraints, and As = A ×A0 be the set of both local and
global constraints on the energy allocations of the system.
Then the payoff function of the coordinator agent can be
mathematically represented as
U0(a, λ; θ) : As × Λ→ R, (2)
where θ = (θ1, . . . , θN ) and θ ∈ Θ with Θ = Θ1×· · ·×ΘN .
The objectives of the resource agents and the coordinator
agent are to maximize their own payoff functions, respec-
tively.
Example 1: Consider the motivating example of supply-
ing the electricity to a group of N distribution loads in the
presence of constrained transmission capacity. Let Ai =
{ai|0 ≤ amini ≤ ai ≤ amaxi } denote the feasible range for
the energy consumption of resource agent i, ∀i = 1, . . . , N ,
where amini and a
max
i are the minimally and maximally
allowed energy consumption, respectively. We assume that
the payoff functions of individual loads only depend on
their own energy allocation and energy price. We assume
a uniform price λ¯ is considered across all the distribution
loads, i.e., λ1 = · · · = λN = λ¯. Then, the payoff function
of resource agent i, ∀i = 1, . . . , N , is defined as
Ui(a, λ; θi) = Ui(ai, λ¯; θi), (3)
where Vi(·) is the utility of energy consumption, ai ∈ Ai
and λ¯ ∈ R. In the rest of this paper, we denote the energy
price as λ¯ whenever it is uniform across individual resource
agents.
On the other hand, the coordinator would like to supply the
electricity to end users at the minimum cost while respecting
the transmission capacity limit. Let A0 = {ai|
∑N
i=1 ai ≤
D} denote the global constraint, where D represents the
energy limit for each market period due to the transmission
capacity limit. Then the payoff function of the coordinator
agent can be defined as
U0(a, λ; θ) =
N∑
i=1
Ui(ai, λ¯; θi) + λ¯
N∑
i=1
ai − C
(
N∑
i=1
ai
)
,
(4)
where C(·) is the cost for the coordinator to procure energy,
a ∈ As and λ¯ ∈ R.
B. Control Decision
In order to achieve maximal payoff, individual agents
make control decisions to maximize their payoff functions
as defined by (1) and (2), respectively. While the payoff
functions depend on the energy allocations and energy prices
of all DERs, it is important to note that the control decisions
of individual agents are not necessarily the energy allocations
or energy prices. For instance, in some works, the coordinator
determines a mapping from the energy allocation to the
price [35], [36]. In some other works the agent submits a
bid and the coordinator determines the energy allocation
and the price according to the bid [23]. Therefore, the
control decisions of individual agents can vary in different
problems. To synthesize a unifying framework that captures
these different cases, it is important to distinguish control
decisions from energy allocation and price.
Let γi ∈ Γi be the control decision of agent i, ∀i =
0, 1, . . . , N , where Γi is the set of constraints on control
γi. To avoid triviality, we assume that the collective control
decisions uniquely determines the market outcome (a, λ).
With slight abuse of notation, the payoff functions (1) can
be written as the following function of {γ0, γ1, . . . , γN},
Ui(γ0, γ1, . . . , γN ; θi) : Γ0 × Γ1 × · · · × ΓN → R. (5)
Remark 1: There exist both local and global constraints
on the energy allocations for individual DERs. The local
constraints, i.e., ai ∈ Ai, represent the limits at the resource
level. These constraints are usually imposed by the local
operational requirements. For example, the energy consump-
tion of the air conditioner should maintain the indoor air
temperature within a specified comfort range. The global
constraints, i.e., a ∈ A0 represent the limits at the system
level. For example, the energy allocations for individual
DERs should respect the power flow constraints imposed
by the network topology. In (5), Γi, ∀i = 1, . . . , N , only
represents local constraints on γi. Note that when there are
coupling constraints on control decisions in (5), we can
easily modify the proposed framework by considering the
generalized equilibrium concept [37], [38]. This is outside
the scope of this survey.
Example 2: Consider an example where a coordinator
purchases the load shedding services from a group of respon-
sive loads to match an electricity deficit. To make up for the
supply deficit d, a natural way is that the coordinator sets the
load shedding price and the consumers choose the amount
of load reduction according to the price. In this example,
we present an alternative approach, generally referred to
as the supply function bidding [39], under which the the
control decisions of consumers are not the energy allocations.
In the supply function bidding scheme, the coordinator
requests each resource agent to submit a supply function
parameterized by bi:
ai = biλ¯. (6)
A supply function maps a price to the amount of demand the
resource agents are willing to reduce, and we impose that
such mapping is linear with respect to λ¯. In this scheme,
each resource agent determines the parameter bi and is
committed to the supply function for delivering biλ¯ units of
load shedding at price λ¯. The price is set by the coordinator
so that the total load shedding matches the electricity deficit,
i.e.,
∑N
i=1 biλ¯ = d. This leads to the following market
outcome, 
λ¯ =
d∑N
i=1 bi
ai =
bid∑N
i=1 bi
, ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
(7)
In this example, the control decision of each resource agent
is bi. The control decision of the coordinator agent is a
function that maps (b1, . . . , bN ) to (a, λ¯) as defined by (7).
Note that the global constraint defined as
∑N
i=1 ai = d is
always satisfied, even though resource agents only choose
their bids according to local constraints, i.e., bi ≥ 0.
C. Information Structure
Information structure specifies what information is avail-
able to the agent when it makes the control decision. In
transactive energy systems, information can be categorized in
two classes including information on types, and information
on control decisions. Information on types specifies whether
one agent knows the private information of others, while
information on control decision specifies whether one agent
knows the control decisions of others. Let Iθi and Iγi be the
sets of information available to agent i on type and control
decisions, respectively. These sets are determined based
on the underlying assumptions of the transactive energy
system. For instance, if the agent i knows its own type
θi and a joint distribution on the types of others, which
are denoted by Θ−i(·), then we have Iθi = {θi,Θ−i(·)}.
If it makes decisions after observing everyone else, then it
knows the control decisions of others, thus we have Iγi =
{γ0, . . . , γi−1, γi+1, . . . , γN}.
An alternative way of representing the information struc-
ture is the type dependence graph Gθ and the decision
dependence graph Gγ . These graphs represent the availability
of information regarding the types and control decisions of
others. The procedure of constructing Gθ is as follows
(1) draw N + 1 nodes, each of which corresponds to an
agent
(2) if agent i knows θj , draw a directed edge from j to i
(3) two nodes are disconnected if neither agent knows the
type of the other.
A graph constructed by this procedure captures the private
information structure of the transactive energy system. As an
example, we show two type dependence graphs in Figures
1(a) and 1(b). In Figure 1(a), the coordinator knows the type
of all agents, but agents do not know the types of other
agents. In Figure 1(b), the coordinator does not know the
type of any agent. Therefore, there is no edge in the graph.
The decision-dependence graph is closely related to the
order of decision making: If all agents made decisions
simultaneously, then no one knows the decisions of others.
In our paper, we group the agents in a number of stages,
and pass the decisions of agents in earlier stages to all
agents in the subsequent stages. In this case, all agents know
the decision of the agents taking actions before them. The
detailed procedure for constructing Gγ is as follows:
(1) divide all agents into M groups, denoted as S1, . . . , SM .
(2) if i ∈ Sm, then agent i makes control decision at stage
m.
(3) ∀i ∈ Sm,∀j ∈ Sp, agent i knows γj if and only if
m > p.
(4) if agent i knows γj before making a control decision,
draw a directed edge from j to i.
Following the above procedure, a decision dependence graph
can be obtained to capture the information structure for
sequential decision making. As an example, Figure 1(c)
shows a transactive energy system where the coordinator
determines γ0 in the first stage, and then passes it to agents
making decisions in the second stage.
D. Solution Concept
The payoff function of each agent (5) depends on the
control decisions of other agents. Therefore, the solution
to the transactive energy system is an equilibrium. An
equilibrium point predicts the stable outcomes of the decision
making process: at the equilibrium, no agent is willing to
deviate given the information available to it. The solution
concept for the equilibrium can be complicated due to the
sequential nature of decision making. For ease of presen-
tation, we first introduce the solution concepts for a singe-
stage problem, then we extend these solution concepts to
multi-stage problems.
1) Single-Stage Transactive Energy Systems: In a single-
stage transactive energy system, all the agents make the
control decisions simultaneously. If their payoff functions are
decoupled, it becomes a standard optimization. Otherwise, it
is a game, where the most widely used solution concept is
the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1: A strategy profile (γ∗0 , γ
∗
1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) is a Nash
equilibrium if for all i = 0, . . . , N and all γi ∈ Γi, we have
Ui(γ
∗
i , γ
∗
−i; θi) ≥ Ui(γi, γ∗−i; θi), (8)
where γ∗−i represents the decisions of all agents except sagent
i, i.e., γ∗−i = {γ∗0 , . . . , γ∗i−1, γ∗i+1, . . . , γ∗N}.
At Nash equilibrium, it is to the agent’s best benefit to follow
the Nash equilibrium strategy given that all other agents
also follow such equilibrium strategy. Therefore, no one will
unilaterally deviate if the system has arrived at the Nash
equilibrium.
A relaxed version of Nash equilibrium is often used in
large population games [40], [41]. It is referred to as the
-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2: A strategy profile (γ∗0 , γ
∗
1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) is an -
Nash equilibrium if for all i = 0, . . . , N and all γi ∈ Γi, we
have
Ui(γ
∗
i , γ
∗
−i; θi) ≥ Ui(γi, γ∗−i; θi)− , (9)
where γ∗−i = {γ∗0 , . . . , γ∗i−1, γ∗i+1, . . . , γ∗N}.
The -Nash equilibrium implicitly assumes that each agent
is indifferent with respect to a small change of  in its
payoff. Under this assumption, an agent is motivated to
play an -Nash equilibrium if other agents also play an -
Nash equilibrium. If  = 0, then -Nash equilibrium strategy
becomes an exact Nash equilibrium.
At a Nash equilibrium, agents will not deviate if others
are also at the Nash equilibrium. However, this concept is
hard to realize when agents have private information. In this
case, each agent does not know the type of others and can not
predict the actions of others in order to make decisions on
its own. Addressing this issue requires a stronger solution
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Fig. 1. The type-dependence graph and decision-dependence graph for a transactive energy system with N agent and one coordinator. (a) the coordinator
knows the types of all agents, (b) the agent private information is unknown to the coordinator, (c) the coordinator makes control decision first, followed
by agents who observe the coordinator decision and act subsequently.
concept, such as the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the
dominant strategy equilibrium.
If all agents have a prior distribution on the types of others,
they can predict the behaviors of other agents based o
the prior distribution and make control decision accordingly.
This can be captured by the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
To this end, we explicitly write γi as γi(θi) to emphasize
that the control decision depends on the private information.
Formally, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 3: A strategy profile (γ∗0 (·), γ∗1(·), . . . , γ∗N (·))
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all i = 0, . . . , N and
all γi(·) ∈ Γi, we have
Eθ−i
[
Ui(γ
∗
i (·), γ∗−i(·); θi)|θi
] ≥ Eθ−i [Ui(γi(·), γ∗−i(·); θi)|θi] ,
(10)
where θ−i is the types of all agents except agent i. The
expectation is over the prior distribution on θ−i.
When the prior distribution on types is not available, the
agents have to make decisions without using any information
about others. This can be captured by a stronger solution
concept, defined as follows [42], [43].
Definition 4: A strategy profile (γ∗0 , γ
∗
1 , . . . , γ
∗
N ) is a dom-
inant strategy equilibrium if for all i = 0, . . . , N and all
γi ∈ Γi, we have
Ui(γ
∗
i , γ−i; θi) ≥ Ui(γi, γ−i; θi), (11)
for all feasible γ−i, where γ−i =
{γ0, . . . , γi−1, γi+1, . . . , γN}.
At a dominant strategy equilibrium, a rational agent always
follows the equilibrium strategy regardless the decisions of
others. In contrast, at Nash equilibrium or Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, the agent plays the equilibrium strategy only
when it has a correct forecast of the actions of other agents.
Therefore, compared to (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, the
dominant strategy equilibrium is much easier to implement:
each agent simply chooses the dominant strategy equilibrium
without knowing anything about others. However, it is also
much harder to guarantee the existence of dominant strategy
equilibrium.
2) Multi-Stage Transactive Energy Systems: The solution
concept for a multi-stage transactive energy system is more
complicated and carries heavy notation [44]. For ease of
presentation, we start with a two-stage problem with control-
dependence graph depicted in Figure 1(c). For this case, the
coordinator agent determines γ0 at the first stage, then each
resource agent chooses γi according to γ0 in the second
stage. Given the first stage decision γ0, the second-stage is
reduced to a single-stage problem. Therefore, a two-stage
problem is equivalent to single-stage problem parameterized
by the first-stage decision. Under a proper solution concept
for the second stage, we denoted the solution as γ∗i (γ0). Note
that γ∗i depends on γ0 as different γ0 leads to different games
and corresponding equilibria.
Given the response of resource agents in the second stage,
the first-stage decision making of the coordinator agent can
be formulated as the following optimization problem,
max
γ0∈Γ0
U0(γ0, γ
∗
1(γ0), . . . , γ
∗
N (γ0)). (12)
In this two-stage game, the solution concept of the second
stage is a game equilibrium, while the solution concept of
the first stage is just a standard optimization. This is because
no one competes with the coordinator in the first stage. If
there are multiple coordinators, both stages may have the
game equilibria as the solution concept [25].
Remark 2: The solution concept can be defined similarly
for games with more than two stages. In this case, the
decision of each agent is parameterized by the decisions of
all agents making decisions prior to it, and the corresponding
solution concept can be chosen for each stage of the game.
In the rest of this paper, we present several representative
transactive energy systems for solving the same market-based
coordination problem with different assumptions, aiming to
clearly illustrate the involved subtleness and complexity.
Each of these transactive energy systems has its own special
formulation under the proposed unifying framework, serving
as a typical example of a class of transactive energy systems
that have been extensively studied in the literature. The com-
parisons between these representative systems are discussed
with detailed literature survey and a pictorial summary in
Figure 2.
III. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
Efficient energy allocation is the main objective of many
works [20], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50]. Although these
Fig. 2. Comparisons for different categories of transactive energy systems. Competitive equilibrium is different from Stackelberg games in coordinator’s
payoff function, Stackelberg game differs from Reverse Stackelberg game in control decisions, and mechanism design differs from reverse Stackelberg
game in both information structure and control decisions.
works differ in various aspects, they share some common fea-
tures related to the well-established concept of competitive
equilibrium in microeconomics [43]. In the following, we
synthesize a transactive energy system as a typical example
for this class of works.
A. Transactive Energy System
Consider the problem of market-based coordination for a
group of N distribution loads. Note that, for the simplicity of
the following discussions, only distribution loads are consid-
ered. However, the results presented herein hold when other
types of DERs are considered. In this section, we assume
that the payoff functions of individual loads depend on their
own energy allocation and energy price. Furthermore, their
payoff functions are quasi-linear with respect to the energy
price. We also assume that the energy price is uniform for
all loads. Under these assumptions, the objective of resource
agent i, ∀i = 1, . . . , N , is to maximize the following payoff
function,
Ui(a, λ; θi) = Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯ai, (13)
where Vi(·) is the utility of energy consumption, ai ∈ Ai,
and λ¯ ∈ R. The objective of the coordinator is to obtain
efficiency energy allocations that maximize the following
payoff function,
U0(a, λ; θ) =
N∑
i=1
Vi(ai; θi)− C
(
N∑
i=1
ai
)
, (14)
where C(·) is the cost for the coordinator to purchase energy
from outside the system, and a ∈ A.
We assume that the coordinator agent may or may not
know the private information of individual resource agents.
It determines the energy price λ¯ in the first stage, and then
resource agents choose their energy consumption ai in the
second stage according to λ¯. Hence, this is a transactive
energy system with the following formulation,
• agent preference: the resource agents and the coordi-
nator agent have preferences defined by (13) and (14),
respectively.
• control decision: γ0 = λ¯ and γi = ai,∀i = 1, . . . , N .
• information structure: the type-dependence graph as in
Figure 1(a) or 1(b), and decision-dependence graph as
in Figure 1(c).
• solution concept: given λ¯, the payoff functions of re-
source agents are decoupled, so it is a standard opti-
mization problem.
It follows from (13) and (14) that the optimal energy price λ¯∗
of the coordinator agent is obtained by solving the following
optimization problem,
max
λ¯∈R
N∑
i=1
Vi
(
a∗i (λ¯); θi
)− C ( N∑
i=1
a∗i (λ¯)
)
(15a)
s.t a∗i (λ¯) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯ai. (15b)
This transactive energy system involves sequential deci-
sion making: the coordinator determines the optimal energy
price first, then individual loads choose their optimal energy
consumption accordingly. In this case, the coordinator should
anticipate the responses of individual loads to its decision,
and exploit this knowledge to determine the price. Such
problem is often referred to as bi-level problem [51], where
the coordinator’s problem has another optimization problem
as a constraint [52], [53], [54].
B. Connection to Competitive Equilibrium
In this subsection, the competitive equilibrium [43] is first
introduced. Then, its connection to the transactive energy
system discussed in the last subsection is presented. We
show that the solution to (15) is essentially a competitive
equilibrium.
Consider a competitive market with one supplier and N
consumers trading electricity. Individual consumers want to
maximize the following payoff functions,
Ui(ai, λ; θi) = Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯ai, ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
where ai ∈ Ai and λ¯ ∈ R, while the supplier wants to
maximize the following payoff function,
Us(y, λ; θs) = λ¯y − C(y; θs),
where θs denotes the private information of the supplier,
y ∈ Y is the energy generation, and Y is the feasible
range for y. In a competitive market, both the consumer and
the supplier take λ¯ as given, and they choose consumption
or production level to maximize their payoffs. The market
outcome is the competitive equilibrium, formally defined as
follows [43, Chap 10]:
Definition 5: The energy allocation vector
(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N , y
∗) and the energy price λ¯∗ constitute a
competitive equilibrium if the following conditions are
satisfied.
(i) Each consumer maximizes the payoff at the equilibrium,
i.e., a∗i is the optimal solution to the following problem,
max
ai
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯∗ai
s.t ai ∈ Ai.
(ii) The supplier maximizes the payoff at the equilibrium,
i.e., y∗ is the optimal solution to the following problem,
max
y
λ¯∗y − C(y; θs)
s.t y ∈ Y.
(iii) Total supply and total demand are balanced, i.e.,∑N
i=1 a
∗
i = y
∗.
In the above, conditions (i) and (ii) state that individual
agents must take the energy price as given and choose the
energy consumption (or production) to maximize their payoff
functions. Condition (iii) requires that at the equilibrium
point, the overall consumption and production identified by
(i) and (ii) must be mutually compatible. That is, no excess
demand or supply appears at the equilibrium point. It is well-
known that competitive equilibrium maximizes the social
welfare [43, Chap 10],
Proposition 1: The competitive equilibrium
(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N , y
∗, λ¯∗) is the optimal solution to the following
social welfare optimization problem,
max
a1,...,aN ,y
N∑
i=1
Vi(ai; θi)− C(y; θs) (16a)
s.t
N∑
i=1
ai = y (16b)
y ∈ Y (16c)
ai ∈ Ai, ∀i = 1, . . . , N. (16d)
The proof of Proposition (1) can be found in [43, Chap
10]. We can show that the competitive equilirbium is the
solution to the transactive energy system defined by (13)–
(15).
Proposition 2: Assume that Vi(·; θi) is concave, C(·) is
convex. Assume that Ai and Y are convex and have at least
one interior point. Then (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N , y
∗, λ¯∗) is a competitive
equilibrium if and only if (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N , λ¯
∗) is the optimal
solution to (15).
Proposition 2 implies that the optimal solution to (15) is a
competitive equilibrium. It can be proved by viewing λ¯∗ as
the Lagrange multiplier of (16b). Together with the results
of Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the
optimal solution to (15) is also the optimal solution to the
social welfare optimization problem (16).
Remark 3: The concept of competitive equilibrium has
been well-studied. The social welfare optimization problem
(16) can be efficiently solved in many different ways as
discussed in the following subsection. The main purpose
of this subsection is to establish the connection of the
transactive energy system (13)–(15) to the well-established
concept of competitive equilibrium so that all the results on
competitive equilibrium can be directly applied to a large
class of transactive energy problems [19], [20], [45], [46],
[47], [48], [49], [50], [55], [56], [57].
C. Computation of Competitive Equilibrium
The social welfare optimization problem (16) is a sim-
ple convex optimization problem if the coordinator agent
knows the types of all the resource agents. However, if the
coordinator does not know these private information, the
objective function of (16) is unknown. In the literature, both
non-iterative and iterative approaches have been proposed to
address this issue.
The non-iterative approach adopts an auction-based market
to determine the optimal energy price, referred to as market
clearing, in a hierarchical manner [4], [5], [6], [7], [26], [58].
The details of the auction-based approach is summarized
in Algorithm 1. To implement this approach, individual
resource agents have to determine their demand curves as
bids at the beginning of each market period and send them
to the coordinator agent. After receiving all the demand bids,
the coordinator aggregates all the demand curves, and find
the intersection between the supply curve and the aggregated
demand curve.
The iterative approach determines the market clearing
price in an iterative manner. Many different algorithms have
Algorithm 1 The Auction-based Approach to Compute the
Competitive Equilibrium
Initialization: Transactive Energy System (13) and (14).
1: Individual resource agents determine their demand
curves by solving
ai(λ¯) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯ai. (17)
2: Individual resource agents send their demand curves
ai(λ¯) as demand bids to the coordinator agent.
3: The Coordinator agent computes the supply curve by
solving
y(λ¯) = arg max
y∈Y
λ¯y − C(y; θs). (18)
4: The coordinator agent determine the energy price so that
N∑
i=1
ai(λ¯) = y(λ¯). (19)
Output: the solution (a∗1, . . . , a∗N , λ¯∗).
been proposed in the literature, including ratio consensus
[55], [56], average consensus [57], primal-dual algorithms
[19], [46], among others. In this subsection, we present an
algorithm based on primal-dual iterations. This algorithm
enables parallel implementation and scales well with the
size of the transactive energy system. Therefore, it has been
widely adopted in many works [19], [20], [45], [46], [47],
[48], [49], [50]. The details of the primal-dual algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 2. It is also referred to as Walrasian
auction [43], and its solution is the Walrasian equilibrium.
To implement this algorithm, the coordinator starts with an
initial guess for the energy price λ¯ and broadcasts it to all
the resource agents. Each resource agent then solves the
individual payoff maximization problem according to (20).
The solutions to the payoff maximization problems are used
to update the dual λ¯ according to (22). The updated dual
variable is then broadcast to resource agents again and this
procedure is iterated until the energy price converges. This
iterative algorithm is a sub-gradient algorithm that converges
to the optimal energy allocation and energy price pair under
the assumptions of Proposition 2 [59]. However, we would
like to point out that these algorithms are not strategy-
proof in that the resource agents may not necessarily have
incentives to follow the specified iteration protocol.
IV. STACKELBERG GAME
For the transactive energy system defined by (13)–(15), the
payoff functions of individual loads are assumed to be quasi-
linear with the energy price. In this section, we generalize
the structure of the payoff functions and cast the coordination
problem as a Stackelberg game instead. Existing results on
this class of transactive energy systems are surveyed with
challenges clearly identified.
Algorithm 2 The Primal-Dual Algorithm to Compute the
Competitive Equilibrium
Initialization: Transactive Energy System (13) and (14).
1: The coordinator agent generates an initial guess of the
energy price, λ¯(0).
2: while Stopping criteria not satisfied do
3: Individual resource agents determine control decisions
by solving
ai(k) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯(k − 1)ai. (20)
4: The Coordinator agent computes the following value,
y(k) = arg max
y∈Y
λ¯(k − 1)y − C(y; θs) (21)
5: The coordinator agent updates the energy price,
λ¯(k) = λ¯(k − 1) + γ(k)
(
N∑
i=1
ai(k)− y(k)
)
. (22)
6: end while
Output: the solution (a∗1, . . . , a∗N , λ¯∗).
A. Transactive Energy System
Consider again the problem of market-based coordination
for a group of N distribution loads. In this section, however,
we assume the following general payoff functions without
imposing any specific forms as in the previous section for
individual loads and the coordinator, respectively,
Ui(a, λ; θi), ∀i = 1, . . . , N, (23)
where ai ∈ Ai and λ ∈ Λ, and
U0(a, λ; θ), (24)
where a ∈ As and λ ∈ Λ. We assume that the coordinator
knows all the private information. The coordinator agent
announces a price vector λ ∈ Λ in the first stage, then each
resource agent chooses ai accordingly in the second stage.
In determining the energy price, the coordinator should an-
ticipate the resource responses to its price so as to maximize
its payoff (24). In the meanwhile, each resource agent also
chooses ai to solve (23). This class of problems are widely
studied in the literature [25], [60], [61], [62], [63], and we
can summarize it as the following transactive energy system,
• agent preference: the resource agents and the coordi-
nator agent have preferences defined by (23) and (24),
respectively.
• control decision: γ0 = λ and γi = ai for ∀i = 1, . . . , N .
• information structure: the type-dependence graph as in
Figure 1(a), and decision-dependence graph as in Figure
1(c).
• solution concept: given λ, the decisions of resource
agents are coupled, and the solution concept is the Nash
equilibrium.
Given the energy price λ, the problem of the second stage
is a game due to the coupling among payoff functions of
resource agents. We define the game equilibrium as
a∗i (λ) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a
∗
−i, λ; θi), ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
where a∗−i = (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
i−1, a
∗
i+1, . . . , a
∗
N ), and a
∗(λ) is the
optimal response of each resource agent to the energy price
λ. Then the decision of the coordinator agent reduces to the
solution to the following optimization problems,
max
λ∈Λ
U0(a
∗
1(λ), . . . , a
∗
N (λ), λ; θ) (25a)
s.t a∗i (λ) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a
∗
−i, λ; θi). (25b)
The transactive energy system defined by (23)–(25) is
different from the one defined by (13)–(15). In the previous
section, the energy price λ is uniform across all resource
agents, that is, λi = λ¯. Furthermore, the payoff functions
of resource agents (13) are quasi-linear, and only depend on
ai and λ¯. In this section, the energy price is not necessarily
uniform, and the payoff functions of resource agents (23)
are general functions of a and λ. For this reason, the
solution concept of the second stage changes from a standard
optimization to the Nash equilibrium.
Example 3: Consider again the motivating example of
supplying the electricity to a group of N distribution loads
in the presence of constrained transmission capacity. The
coordinator agent can indirectly affect the end users by
setting retail prices. Different from Example 1, the structures
of the payoff functions of the resource agents and the
coordinator agent can be fairly general. We assume that
the coordinator agent knows all the private information θ.
It determines the energy price λ¯ in the first stage, and each
resource agent determines ai accordingly in the second stage.
Given the energy price λ¯, the optimal responses of resource
agents are given as
a∗i (λ¯) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯ai, ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
Taking into account the optimal responses of resource agents,
the coordinator agent can determine the optimal energy price
λ¯ by formulating the following optimization problem,
max
λ¯∈R
U0(a
∗(λ¯), λ¯; θ)
s.t
N∑
i=1
a∗i (λ¯) ≤ D
a∗i (λ¯) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯ai, ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
where a∗(λ¯) = (a∗1(λ¯), . . . , a
∗
N (λ¯)). This is a special case
of (25).
B. State of the Art and Challenges
Similar to the transactive energy system defined by (13)–
(15), the transactive energy systems defined by (23)–(25)
also involves sequential decision making. Thus, it is also a
bi-level problem. In the previous section, it follows from
Corollary (1) that the bi-level optimization problem (15)
can be transformed into the a single-level optimization, that
is, social welfare optimization problem (16), which can be
efficiently solved. However, this simplification is only pos-
sible for quasi-linear payoff functions with local constraints.
These properties do not carry over to more general cases.
Therefore, comparing to (15), the optimization problem (25)
is more general, but also significantly more challenging from
a computational viewpoint.
In the literature, problem (25) is often referred to as a
Stackelberg game [51], [64], [65]. The concept of Stackel-
berg game originates from economics [64], and has received
substantial attentions in recent years in the problem of
coordinating DERs [25], [66], [60], [62] ,[61], [63], [67],
[68], [69], [70]. Different from the standard optimization,
it has an inner optimization problem as a constraint. For
this reason, Stackelberg game generally involves non-convex
and non-differentiable optimization problems, which is rather
challenging from a computational viewpoint. In fact, problem
(25) is strongly NP-hard [71]. Furthermore, the problem of
merely checking the global or local optimality for (25) is
NP-hard [52], even if all payoff functions and constraints
are linear.
Since the non-convexity and non-differentiability of (25)
greatly undermine our ability to solve the general problem
for the global optimality, special attentions have been given
to the simpler cases where all payoff functions and con-
straints are linear [72], [73]. For those problems with linear
payoff functions, the optimal solution can be found at the
vertex of the underlying polyhedron. This leads to many
global algorithms based on enumerative computation such as
vertex enumeration [74], [75], [76], branch-and-bound algo-
rithms [77], [78], complementary pivoting algorithms [79],
[80], among others. These algorithms have been extended
to quadratic payoff functions, where the globally optimal
solution can be also guaranteed [81], [82], [83]. On the
other hand, if the objectives are general nonlinear functions,
solution attempts include gradient descent [84], [85], penalty
function method [86], [87], [88], trust region algorithms [89],
[90], etc. However, due to the non-convexity of (25), most
of these algorithms can only find locally optimal solutions.
V. REVERSE STACKELBERG GAME
In many problems of interest, the control decision of the
coordinator agent is not a price, but rather a pricing function
that depends on the control decisions of resource agents [91],
[92], [93]. This leads to a new class of transactive energy sys-
tems. In this section, we formulate the coordination problem
as a reverse Stackelberg game. We survey the existing results
on this class of transactive energy systems and identify the
associated technical challenges.
A. Transactive Energy System
Consider again the market-based coordination problem
with the general payoff functions as in (23) and (24). In this
section, however, we assume the energy price λ is not just
a value but a function depending on the energy allocation
a. Let λ(·) denote the pricing function. Then the respective
payoff functions for individual agents and the coordinators
become
Ui(a, λ(a); θi), ∀i = 1, . . . , N, (26)
where ai ∈ Ai and λ(a) ∈ Λ, and
U0(a, λ(a); θ), (27)
where a ∈ As and λ(a) ∈ Λ. We assume that the coordinator
knows all the private information, and announces a pricing
function λ(·) to all the resource agents. Each resource agent
subsequently chooses ai to maximize its payoff function
after receiving λ(·). Formally, this can be captured by the
following transactive energy system,
• agent preference: the resource agents and the coordi-
nator agent have preferences defined by (26) and (27),
respectively.
• control decision: γ0 = λ(·) and γi = ai,∀i = 1, . . . , N .
• information structure: type-dependence graph as in Fig-
ure 1(a), and decision-dependence graph as in Figure
1(c).
• solution concept: given λ(·), the decisions of resource
agents are coupled, and the solution concept is the Nash
equilibrium.
Given the pricing function λ(·) for energy, the problem
of the second-stage is a game due to the coupling among
the payoff functions of resource agents. We define the game
equilibrium as follows:
a∗i (λ(·)) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a
∗
−i, λ(ai, a
∗
−i); θi), ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
where a∗i (λ(·)) is the optimal response of each resource
agent to the pricing function λ(·) of energy. With slight abuse
of notation, we denote a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N ) as a
∗(λ(·)) to
explicitly capture the dependence of a∗ on λ(·). Using this
notation, the decision of the coordinator agent reduces to the
solution to the following optimization problem,
max
λ(·)∈Λ
U0(a
∗(λ(·)), λ(a∗(λ(·))); θ) (28a)
s.t a∗(λ(·)) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a
∗
−i, λ(ai, a
∗
−i); θi).(28b)
Example 4: Consider again the motivating example of
supplying the electricity to a group of N distribution loads in
the presence of constrained transmission capacity. Different
from previous examples, the payoff functions of resource
agents and the coordinator agent are modeled as (26) and
(27), respectively. We assume that the coordinator agent
knows all the private information θ. This coordinator deter-
mines the pricing function λ¯(·) of energy in the first stage,
and each agent determines ai accordingly in the second
stage. Given the pricing function λ¯(·), the optimal responses
of resource agents are given as
a∗(λ¯(·)) = arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯(ai, a∗−i)ai.
Taking into account the optimal responses of resource agents,
the coordinator agent can determine the optimal pricing
function λ¯(·) by formulating the following optimization
problem,
max
λ¯(·)∈R
U0
(
a∗(λ¯(·)), λ¯(a∗(λ¯(·))); θ)
s.t
N∑
i=1
a∗i (λ¯(·)) ≤ D
a∗i (λ¯(·)) = arg max
ai≥0
Vi(ai; θi)− λ¯(ai, a∗−i)ai, ∀i,
where a∗(λ¯(·)) = (a∗1(λ¯(·)), . . . , a∗N (λ¯(·))). This is a a
special case of (28).
B. State of the Art and Challenges
In the literature, problem (28) is often referred to as the
reverse Stackelberg game [94], [95]. It is also known as
inverse Stackelberg game [96], [97], or as a Stackelberg
game with an incentive information structure [98], [99].
Since a∗ depends on γ(·), the problem enters the field of
composed functions [100], which is known to be notoriously
complex. For this reason, the mainstream for solving the
reverse Stackelberg game is an indirect approach [95], [99]:
instead of directly solving (28), the coordinator agent first
relaxes (28) by assuming that each resource agent supports
the coordinator agent to maximize its payoff function. This
gives rise to the following team problem,
max
a∈A,λ∈Λ
U0 (a, λ; θ) (29)
Let (aτ , λτ ) denote the solution to the team problem (29).
Because (29) is equivalent to (28a) without the constraint
(28b), the optimal value of (29) provides an upper bound
for the optimal value of (28). The key idea of the indirect
approach is that if we can find a pricing function λ(·)
that realizes the team solution, i.e., a∗(λ(·)) = aτ and
λ(a∗(·)) = λτ , then λ(·) achieves this upper bound and
solves the reverse Stackelberg game (28). Since the team
solution is merely an upper bound, it is not always achievable
by a pricing function. When such a pricing function exists,
problem (28) is called incentive-controllable [99]. Further-
more, if the optimal pricing function is linear or affine, the
problem is called linearly incentive-controllable.
Fortunately, a large class of reverse Stackelberg games is
shown to be incentive-controllable when the system has only
one resource agent and one coordinator [95], [101], [102],
[103].
Theorem 1: Let N = 1. If the set Ω = {(a1, λ1) ∈ A1 ×
R|U1(a1, λ1; θ1) ≥ U1(aτ1 , λτ1 ; θ1)} is strictly convex, and
U1(a1, λ1; θ1) is differentiable with 5a1U1(aτ1 , λτ1 ; θ1) 6= 0,
then (28) is linearly incentive-controllable with the following
optimal pricing function,
λ1(a1) = λ
τ
1 −Q(a1 − aτ1), (30)
where the linear operator Q : A1 → R is chosen according
to Q∇a1U1(aτ1 , λτ ; θ1) = ∇λ1U1(aτ1 , λτ1 ; θ1).
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in [101]. It
implies that if the payoff function of the single resource
agent is concave and continuously differentiable, and the
payoff function of the coordinator agent is also continuously
differentiable, then the market-based coordination problem
is linearly incentive-controllable. In an effort to polish this
result, a necessary and sufficient condition has been pro-
posed in [103], which further relaxes the differentiability
requirement and allows the payoff functions to be non-
convex. In addition, nonlinear optimal pricing function was
also considered in [95], which enlarges the class of incentive-
controllable problems.
However, all these results are limited to the problems
involving one coordinator and one resource. When there are
multiple resource agents, the lower level decision making
problem is typically coupled, thus the aforementioned results
are hard to generalize. To circumvent this difficulty, one way
is to design a set of pricing functions so that the resulting
payoff functions of individual resource agents are identical
[91], [92], [93], [96], [104], [105]. This approach is possible
if the coordinator has enough freedom to manipulate the
system (e.g., the coordinator is allowed to design different
pricing functions for different resource agents). In this case,
the multi-agent problem reduces to a one-agent problem,
for which numerous tools are available in the literature.
However, in many transactive energy systems, tailoring the
payoff functions of resource agents is not possible. In these
cases, the reverse Stackelberg game is only proved to be
linearly incentive-controllable when the payoff functions of
resource agents are linear and the payoff function of the
coordinator agent is quadratic [106]. Beyond the linear-
quadratic case, some preliminary attempts have also been
made. For instance, [97] proves the existence of an optimal
solution, and [107] and [108] derived sub-optimal solutions
for the reverse Stackelberg game. However, solving the
reveres Stackelberg game with multiple followers to the
global optimality remains an interesting open problem [94].
VI. MECHANISM DESIGN
The results on the Stackelberg game and reverse Stack-
elberg game build upon an underlying assumption that the
coordinator agent has the complete information regarding
the preferences of all the resource agents. For instance, to
implement the optimal policy in Theorem 1, the coordinator
agent has to know the gradient of the payoff function of
each resource agent, which is often unavailable in practice.
This section addresses this concern by formulating a few
transactive energy systems that can be cast as a mechanism
design problem [42], [109]. We study different results by
varying the solution concepts, and survey the existing results
in each category.
A. Preliminaries on Mechanism Design
Consider again the market-based coordination problem
for a group of N distribution loads. When it is cast as a
mechanism design problem, the coordinator agent designs
what information to be requested from resource agents and
how to use that information so that a system-level coor-
dination objective can be achieved. We define an outcome
x ∈ X that consists of the energy allocations ai for resource
agents and their payments ti received from the coordinator
agent, i.e., x = (a1, . . . , aN , t1, . . . , tN ), where ti = λiai.
Note that for resource agents that consume the energy, the
corresponding payments will be negative. With slight abuse
of notation, we denote the payoff function of each resource
agent as Ui(x; θi), ∀i = 1, . . . , N . Let f(θ) : Θ → X
denote the social choice function. The value of f(θ) specifies
the outcome preferred by the coordinator when the private
information is known. Therefore, the payoff function of the
coordinator agent is encoded in the social choice function.
To elicit private information, the coordinator agent re-
quests each resource agent to submit a bid. This is modeled
by a collection of message spaces M = M1 × · · · ×MN ,
where each resource agent chooses a bid mi ∈ Mi. In
addition, the coordinator also specifies an outcome function
g(m1, . . . ,mN ) : M → X that determines the market
outcome x based on the bids from all the resource agents.
This outcome function and the message space constitute
a mechanism, denoted as Γ = (M, g(·)). The mechanism
couples the decisions of all the resource agents and induces
a game problem. When different mechanisms are used,
different games will be induced.
If there is a mechanism that achieves the objective of the
coordinator, we say it can implement the social choice func-
tion [110], [111]. Formally, the concept of implementation
is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Implementation [43]): A mechanism Γ =
(M, g(·)) implements the social choice function f(·) in a
dominant strategy equilibrium (Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
or Nash equilibrium) if for all θ ∈ Θ, there exists a dominant
strategy equilibrium (Bayesian Nash equilibrium, or Nash
equilibrium) m∗ of Γ such that g(m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
N ) = f(θ).
In principle, one shall search over the space of all mech-
anisms to check whether a social choice function can be
implemented. This is clearly a daunting task. Fortunately, due
to the celebrated revelation principle [112], [113], it turns out
that it is sufficient to search over direct mechanisms.
Definition 7: A mechanism Γ = (M, g(·)) is a direct
mechanism if the message space for each resource agent is
restricted to Θi, i.e., Mi = Θi.
In a direct mechanism, the coordinator agent directly asks
individual resource agents to submit their types and sets the
outcome function to be the social choice function. Clearly,
the coordinator expects individual resources to truthfully
submitm their types. If truthful bidding is a game equilib-
rium, the mechanism is incentive compatible in the solution
concept of dominant strategy equilibrium, Bayesian Nash
equilibrium or Nash equilibrium. Equivalently, the mecha-
nism truthfully implements the social choice function in the
corresponding solution concept. According to the revelation
principle, if there exists a mechanism that implements the
social choice function in a solution concept, then there
is also a direct mechanism that truthfully implements the
social choice function in this solution concept. Therefore, we
can restrict our attention to the class of direct mechanisms
without loss of generality. In the rest of this section, we study
how to implement a social choice function under different
solution concepts, and we focus on direct mechanisms.
B. Dominant Strategy Implementation
Consider a transactive energy system with the following
formulation,
• agent preference: the preference of resource agent i is
captured by Ui(x; θi) with x ∈ X , and the preference
of the coordinator is encoded in f(·).
• control decision: γi = mi,∀i = 1, . . . , N and γ0 =
g(·).
• information structure: type-dependence graph as in Fig-
ure 1(b), and decision-dependence graph as in Figure
1(c).
• solution concept: given g(·), the solution concept is the
dominant strategy equilibrium.
This transactive energy system solves a mechanism design
problem with the dominant strategy equilibrium, which has
been the focus of many works [43], [42]. It turns out that
the solution is closely related to the dictatorship of the social
choice function.
Definition 8: A social choice function f(·) is dictatorial
if there is an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that for all θ ∈ Θ
f(θ) ∈ {x ∈ X : Ui(x; θi) ≥ Ui(x′; θi) for all x′ ∈ X} .
Based on Definition 8, if a social choice function is dictato-
rial, then there is an agent in the system (also referred to as
the dictator) whose optimal decision is completely aligned
with the social choice. In this case, the objective of the coor-
dinator agent is equivalent to maximizing Ui, which totally
neglects the payoff of other agents in the system. In this
regard, dictatorship is an undesirable property for the social
choice function. However, as dominant strategy equilibrium
is rather strong, it turns out that a social choice function has
to be dictatorial in order to be truthfully implementable in a
dominant strategy equilibrium. This negative result is known
as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [43], [114].
Theorem 2: Let Ui(x; θi) be a continuous functions of x,
and assume that the range of a social choice function f(·) has
at least three elements. Then the social choice function f(·) is
truthfully implementable in a dominant strategy equilibrium
if and only if it is dictatorial.
This theorem implies that it is impossible to find a solution
to the transactive energy system described in this section,
unless the social choice function is dictatorial. In practice,
for the problem of market-based coordination for DERs, the
objective of the coordinator agent is often to maximize the
social welfare, or the profit of the coordinator. In general, the
social choice function corresponding to such an objective
cannot admit a dictator in the system. Hence, finding a
solution of dominant strategy equilibrium to this coordination
problem is generally impossible.
To circumvent this difficulty, we can either consider a
more restricted class of payoff functions, or relax the solution
concept. In the rest of this subsection, we consider the first
case.
Consider a special case for which each resource agent
has a quasi-linear payoff function denoted as Ui(x; θi) =
Vi(a; θi) + ti. The first term Vi is the utility function, which
is assumed to depend on a instead of only ai as in (13), and
the second term ti is the payment from the coordinator agent
to the resource agent. Note that In addition, we assume that
the objective of the coordinator is to maximize the social
welfare. In other words, if we decompose the social choice
function in two parts, i.e., f(θ) = (a∗(θ), t∗(θ)), then the
first part should satisfy the following,
a∗(θ) = arg max
a∈As
N∑
i=1
Vi(a; θi), (31)
Due to the special structure of this payoff functions, we can
find a mechanism that truthfully implements the social choice
function in a dominant strategy equilibrium. This mechanism
is known as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
[115], [116].
Theorem 3: The social choice function f(θ) =
(a∗(θ), t1(θ), . . . , tN (θ)) is truthfully implementable
in a dominant strategy equilibrium if a∗(θ) satisfies (31),
and
ti(θ˜) =
∑
j 6=i
Vj(a
∗(θ˜); θ˜j) + hi(θ˜−i). (32)
for all i and all θ˜i ∈ Θi, where θ˜ = (θ˜1, . . . , θ˜N ) is the agent
bid, and h−i(·) can be any function that does not depend on
θ˜i.
The proof of this theorem can be found in [43, Chap 23].
It implies that if the mechanism adopts the allocation rule
(31) and payment rule (32), then each resource agent will
bid truthfully regardless of the decisions of other agents.
In fact, we can also prove that under mild conditions, the
VCG mechanism (31) and (32) is the only mechanism
that implements the social choice function in a dominant
strategy equilibrium. This uniqueness result is discussed in
[43, P.879].
The VCG mechanism has been successfully applied in the
design of electricity market and demand response problems
[23], [117], [118], [119], [120], [121]. In the design of elec-
tricity markets, the coordinator represents the independent
system operator (ISO), and the resource agents are either
consumers or suppliers. Since the ISO is non-profit, it is
important to ensure that the mechanism can be implemented
by the ISO without any external funding, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 ti ≤ 0.
Formally, a mechanism is budget balanced (or weakly budget
balanced) if
∑N
i=1 ti = 0 (or
∑N
i=1 ti ≤ 0). Unfortunately,
the VCG mechanism fails this condition [122]. Furthermore,
it is shown that under mild conditions, no social choice func-
tion can be truthfully implementable in a dominant strategy
equilibrium with a budget balanced mechanism [123].
C. Bayesian Nash Implementation
To address the budget concern, one way is to relax the
solution concept. In this subsection, we consider the transac-
tive energy system solving a mechanism design problem with
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We assume that the types of
individual resources, θ = (θ1, . . . , θN ), are drawn from a
set Θ according to the probability distribution φ(θ). Given
the joint distribution, resource agents choose their control
decisions to maximize their expected payoff. Hence, this
tranactive energy system has the following formulation,
• agent preference: the preference of each resource agent
is captured by Ui(x; θi) with x ∈ X , and the preference
of the coordinator agent is encoded in f(·).
• control decision: γi = mi,∀i = 1, . . . , N and γ0 =
g(·).
• information structure: φ(θ) is common knowledge,
type-dependence graph as in Figure 1(b), and decision-
dependence graph as in Figure 1(c).
• solution concept: given g(·), the decisions of resource
agents are coupled, and the solution concept is the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Since the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is weaker than the
dominant strategy equilibrium, we can slightly modify the
VCG mechanism (32) to provide a solution that truthfully
implements the social choice function in a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Furthermore, under a proper choice of hi(·) in
(32), the mechanism can be budget balanced [124], [125].
Theorem 4: The social choice function f(θ) =
(a∗(θ), t1(θ), . . . , tN (θ)) is truthfully implementable
in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if a∗(θ) satisfies (31), and
ti(θ˜) =
∑
j 6=i
Eθ˜−i
[
Vj(a
∗(θ˜); θ˜j)
∣∣∣ θi] (33)
+
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
Eθ˜−i
∑
j 6=k
Vj(a
∗(θ˜); θ˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ θk
 . (34)
Furthermore, the mechanism is budget balanced, i.e.,∑N
i=1 ti(θ) ≡ 0.
This result implies that if the coordinator determines the al-
location according to (31) and set the payment based on (33),
then the mechanism is budget balanced, and can truthfully
implement the social choice function in a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. This holds as long as the payoff functions of
resource agents are quasi-linear, i.e., Ui(x; θi) = Vi(a; θi) +
ti. Stronger results can be obtained in a more restricted
setting. For instance, if the resource agent has a scalar-
type linear utility, i.e., Vi(a; θi) = θivi(a), necessary and
sufficient conditions are available to identify which social
choice function is truthfully implementable [109, Chap. 3],
[126].
In many application of interest, the resource agents are
free to opt out of the mechanism. Therefore, in addition
to guarantee incentive compatibility and budget balance, we
also need to ensure individual rationality constraint, so that
each resource agent wants to participate into the mechanism.
Formally, the individual rationality constraint is defined as
follows
Definition 9: A mechanism with the outcome function
g(·) is interim individual rational if for all i, we have
Eθ˜−i [Ui(g(θi, θ˜−i); θi)|θi] ≥ 0 for all θi ∈ Θi.
If a mechanism is interim individual rational, then each
resource agent is willing to participate after he observes his
private value and before the mechanism outcome is revealed.
While individual rationality is a desirable property, according
to the Myerson-Stterthwaite Theorem [127], there is no
mechanism that is both Bayesian Nash incentive compatible,
budget balanced, and interim individual rational. This result
is true even if there are only two agents holding private
valuations toward a single item.
D. Nash Implementation
To achieve both individual rationality and budget balance,
we further relax the solution concept to the Nash equilibrium.
As such, consider the transactive energy system with the
following formulation,
• agent preference: the preference of each resource agent
is captured by Ui(x; θi) with x ∈ X , and the preference
of the coordinator agent is encoded in f(·).
• control decision: γi = mi,∀i = 1, . . . , N and γ0 =
g(·).
• information structure: type-dependence graph as in Fig-
ure 1(b), and decision-dependence graph as in Figure
1(c).
• solution concept: adopt the Nash equilibrium as the
solution.
It is possible to design a mechanism that is budget-
balanced, individual rational and truthfully implement the
desired social choice function in a Nash equilibrium. Below
we discuss some examples.
First, consider a case with the quasi-linear payoff functions
defined as Ui(x; θi) = Vi(ai; θi) + ti. Assume that ai ∈ R
and Vi(·; θi) is concave and differentiable. One relevant
mechanism that realizes efficient energy allocation is the
scalar strategy VCG (SSVCG) mechanism [128, Chap. 21],
[129], [130]. Similar to the VCG mechanism, the idea of
SSVCG mechanism is to ask each reousrce agent to submit
a utility function. However, instead of an arbitrary class of
functions, the scalar strategy VCG has a more restricted
message space so that the agent has to choose from a given
family of functions that can be parameterized by a scalar
σi ∈ R, i.e., V¯i(ai;σi). In other words, the coordinator
specifies a class of single-parameterized functions V¯i(ai;σi)
and each agent submits a parameter σi.
Definition 10: Let V denote the family of functions that
satisfy the following conditions,
(i) For each σi, V¯i(·;σi) is strictly concave, strictly in-
creasing, and continuously differentiable at all σi > 0;
(ii) For all γ > 0, and ai ∈ R, there exists a σi such that
V¯ ′i (ai;σi) = γ.
Note that a lot of structures of V¯i satisfy Definition 10,
such as V¯i(ai;σi) = σia2i or V¯i(ai;σi) = σilog(ai). The
coordinator can choose from any one of them. After V is
announced, each resource agent submits a σi, and the co-
ordinator runs the VCG mechanism on the payoff functions
V¯i(ai;σi). It can be shown that the Nash equilibrium of the
game is efficient.
Theorem 5: Consider a mechanism Γ = (V, . . . ,V, g(·)),
where the outcome function g(·) consists of an allocation
rule a∗(·) that satisfies
a∗(σ) = arg max
a
N∑
i=1
V¯i(ai;σi), (35)
and a payment rule ti(·) that satisfies:
ti(σ) =
∑
j 6=i
V¯j(a
∗
j (σ);σj) + hi(σ−i). (36)
Under Assumption 10, the mechanism Γ has a Nash equi-
librium σ∗ that satisfies V¯ ′i (a
∗(σ∗)) = Ui(a∗(σ∗); θi), and
it is efficient, i.e., σ∗ = arg maxa
∑N
i=1 Ui(ai; θi).
The proof of Theorem 5 can be found in [129] and [128,
Chap. 21]. It implies that at a Nash equilibrium, each
resource agent chooses a parameter so that the declared
marginal utility equals the true marginal utility. Note that this
mechanism provides very great flexibility and has very light
communication and computation requirements. For instance,
if V¯i is chosen to be quadratic, then each resource agent
only needs to submit a scalar, and the coordinator agent
only needs to solve a quadratic program to determine the
allocation and payment. However, since the resource agents
do not have complete information, iterations are needed to
reach the Nash equilibrium.
Many other works offer efficient mechanisms when the
payoff function is quasi-linear. For instance, [131] and [132]
consider an electricity market design where each resource
agent is required to propose an allocation and price. The co-
ordinator then determines the allocation and price so that the
induced Nash equilibrium maximizes the social welfare. In
[133] and [134], an infinite subclass of efficient mechanisms
was obtained to always maximize the social welfare, and one
can choose among this class to optimize other metrics of the
mechanism. In addition, the objective of some applications is
not to achieve efficient allocation, but rather to elicit private
information for other coordination purposes. For instance,
[135] considers the problem of eliciting a baseline to meet
random load reduction, and [136] and [137] elicit parameters
for the demand response assets to lower payments and better
predict day-ahead energy consumption. Note that all these
mechanisms can be made budget balanced [132], [136], [137]
and/or individual rational [132], [131], [135].
Another notable class of mechanisms considers a uniform
price market relying on the supply function bidding [138]. In
supply function bidding, each supplier declares the amount
they would like to provide at any price, and the market
is cleared at a uniform price. When each resource agent
becomes strategic, the supply function bidding leads to
inefficient energy allocation, but has bounded efficiency loss
[139], [140]. This result was later extended to electricity
market design with capacity constraints [141], or distribution
network constraints [142], [143].
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a unifying framework for transactive
energy systems that are designed to solve the problem of
market-based coordinationa for DERs. The proposed frame-
work consists of four elements that are important in identi-
fying and comparing different transactive energy systems in
the literature. We used these elements to analyze a number
of important classes of transactive energy systems, includ-
ing the competitive equilibrium, Stackelberg game, reverse
Stackelberg game, and mechanism design, each of which has
a special formulation. We also surveyed available tools and
results in the literature. Future work includes extending the
framework to explicitly capture more complicated dynamics,
and incorporating uncertainties from the model and the
environment.
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